University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary

2017

Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding
Jud Campbell

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Campbell, Jud, "Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding" (2017). Constitutional Commentary. 553.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/553

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

5 - CAMPBELL_DRAFT 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/3/17 8:59 AM

REPUBLICANISM AND NATURAL RIGHTS
AT THE FOUNDING
OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING
THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE
PEOPLE. By Randy E. Barnett.1 New York: HarperCollins
Publishers. 2016. Pp. xiv + 283. $26.99 (cloth).
Jud Campbell2
Americans mostly take constitutional legitimacy for granted,
leaving the Supreme Court and its illustrious bar to do their work
without concern for political philosophy. A great strength of
Randy Barnett’s scholarship, including his latest book, Our
Republican Constitution,3 is his sustained effort to dislodge that
philosophical complacency. Barnett calls on us to consider why
our Constitution is legitimate before we decide how it should be
interpreted.
In this sense, Barnett brings us closer to an eighteenthcentury intellectual world commonly known as “the Founding.”
Constitutionalism at the Founding was intimately tied to
questions of political philosophy, based in part on the idea of
“natural rights.” Constitutional historians have disparaged the
importance of natural rights,4 but Barnett deserves credit for

1. Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory; Director, Georgetown Center
for the Constitution.
2. Assistant Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. The author thanks
Randy Barnett, Larry Kramer, Corrina Lain, Jack Preis, and the other contributors to this
symposium for helpful suggestions, and he especially thanks Michael McConnell for
ongoing and extraordinarily helpful conversations about this topic.
3. RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE
LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016).
4. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 88–95 (1986); see also Isaac Kramnick,
Republican Revisionism Revisited, 87 AM. HIST. REV. 629, 629–35 (1982) (surveying how
a generation of “republican” scholarship downplayed the influence of Lockean ideas at
the Founding).
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pushing back. Natural rights featured prominently in FoundingEra constitutional thought.5
But what were natural rights? Today we tend to think about
natural rights as non-positivist claims to limits on governmental
authority—typically claims derived from religion, morality, or
logic. The claims might be legal (e.g., “natural rights are
enforceable in court”), or they might simply be philosophical
(e.g., “a government that disrespects natural rights is unjust or
illegitimate”). But these “rights,” by their very definition, exist
independent of governmental control. Indeed, that is what makes
them “natural.”
Yet language often shifts over time, and it might turn out that
“natural rights” carried a very different meaning over two
centuries ago. As historian Jonathan Gienapp cautions, “the first
key to understanding the American Founding is appreciating that
it is a foreign world.”6
This Essay sketches an alternative—and perhaps quite
unfamiliar—view of Founding-Era natural rights, their
relationship to governmental authority, and their enforceability.7
With the exception of certain “rights of the mind,”8 natural rights
were not really “rights” at all, in the sense of being determinate
legal privileges or immunities. Rather, embracing natural rights
meant embracing a mode of reasoning. And the crux of the idea—
in stark contrast to the modern notion of “natural rights”—was to
create a representative government that best served the public
good.

5. See p. 67 (collecting invocations of natural rights in various state declarations of
rights).
6. Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and Holism: Failures of Originalist Translation,
84 FORDHAM L. REV. 935, 942 (2015). Gienapp attributes this insight to the work of others,
including Bernard Bailyn, Quentin Skinner, and Gordon Wood. Id. at 943, 945.
7. This Essay describes a historical system of thought based on the stated political
philosophy of American political elites in the late eighteenth century. References to “the
Founders,” their “goals,” and so forth should be read accordingly. This Essay does not
defend the claim that this system of thought was universally accepted at the Founding, nor
that it ought to be incorporated into modern constitutional interpretation. This Essay thus
reacts to Barnett’s portrait of the Founders, but it does not engage in the same genre of
historical writing. See Jack M. Balkin, Which Republican Constitution?, 32 CONST.
COMMENT. 31, 38 (2016).
8. NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 174
(Rutland, J. Lyon 1793). This Essay largely ignores these rights, which I will address in
future work.
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Individual liberty mattered, of course, and the Framers
indeed wanted to insulate politics from the whims of capricious
majorities. But the overriding goal of their efforts was to improve
representation, not lessen it, and to ensure that the general
welfare was the government’s paramount concern. The FoundingEra idea of “natural rights” thus called for judicial deference to
legislative judgments, and it favored broader governmental power
just as much as limits to that power. In short, natural rights called
for good government, not necessarily less government.
SOCIAL-CONTRACT THEORY
The Founders spoke about their “natural rights” with a
familiarity that Americans have long since lost. Recovering that
concept requires going back to its origins in social-contract theory.
Social-contract theory, which underpinned most of
Founding-Era constitutionalism,9 was organized around different
stages of political development. The theory began by imagining
what things would be like without a government—a condition
known as a “state of nature.” Properly understood, this inquiry
was hypothetical rather than historical.10 The idea of a state of
nature was “abstract,” James Otis explained in his famous Rights
of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, acknowledging that
“men come into the world and into society at the same instant.”11
Yet that idea remained useful, Otis insisted, because “the natural
and original rights of each individual may be illustrated and
explained in this way better than in any other.”12

9. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE 112 (1991); Thad W. Tate, The Social
Contract in America, 1774-1787: Revolutionary Theory as Conservative Instrument, 22 WM.
& MARY Q. 375 (1965).
10. See John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 193, 213 (1993)
(“The social contract was a legal fiction explaining the stipulations under which individuals
left the state of nature and created societies.”); see, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *47 (“This notion, of an actually existing unconnected state of nature, is
too wild to be seriously admitted.”); James Madison, Essay on Sovereignty (1835), in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 568, 570 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (describing the
“hypothesis” that social-contract theory “supposes”); 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF
THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 14 (Windham, John Byrne 1795) (“I doubt
whether a state of nature ever did, or can exist; but I can imagine such a state, and thence
infer the advantages derived from a union in society.”).
11. JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED
28 (Boston, Edes & Gill 1764).
12. Id.
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In a state of nature, individuals were thought to have certain
freedoms or liberties—commonly known as “natural rights.”13 By
definition, these “rights” existed without reference to
governmental authority. They were simply freedoms that
individuals enjoyed vis-à-vis each other, subject only to the
confines of “natural law”—roughly defined as the requirements
of reason, justice, and morality.14 As James Wilson explained,
“natural liberty” was the “right” of every person to act “for the
accomplishment of those purposes, in such a manner, and upon
such objects, as his inclination and judgment shall direct; provided
he does no injury to others; and provided some publick interests
do not demand his labours.”15
Social-contract theory then hypothesized that individuals,
recognizing the benefits of collective action, would “join in one
body . . . to manage, with their joint powers and wills, whatever
should regard their common preservation, security, and
happiness.”16 This imagined agreement was a “social contract” (or
“social compact”), and it required the consent of every
individual.17 The result was a single entity—a body politic—
composed of all the members of the political society. In the words
of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, “The body politic is
formed by a voluntary association of individuals. It is a social
compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen,
and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed
by certain laws for the common good.”18
Like the state of nature, the social contract was imaginary but
nonetheless had powerful implications for the proper scope of
governmental power. “HOWEVER the historical fact may be of a

13. See, e.g., James Wilson, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 COLLECTED
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1053, 1055–56 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007).
14. See Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American
Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 922–30 (1993) (describing natural rights).
15. Wilson, supra note 13, at 1055–56.
16. James Wilson, Of Municipal Law, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON
549, 553–54 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007); see also JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, bk. 2, chap. 9, § 130 (5th ed.; London, A. Bettesworth 1728)
(individuals surrender “as much . . . natural Liberty . . . as the Good, Prosperity, and Safety
of the Society shall require”).
17. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 10, at 570; JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 6 (Philadelphia,
Hall & Sellers 1787); Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted (Feb. 23, 1775), in 1 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 81, 88 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961).
18. MASS. CONST. of 1780, Preamble.
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social contract,” English jurist Richard Wooddeson explained,
“government ought to be, and is generally considered as founded
on consent, tacit or express, on a real, or quasi, compact. This
theory is a material basis of political rights; and as a theoretical
point is not difficult to be maintained.”19
At the next stage of political development, the body politic
formed a system of government in an agreement known as a
“constitution.” Unlike the social contract, which required
unanimous consent, the constitution required only the consent of
the body politic, based on majority rule.20 Even after the
formation of government, however, the body politic still retained
supreme political authority, or “sovereignty.”21 James Wilson
summarized the idea nicely in his law lectures:
While those, who were about to form a society, continued
separate and independent men, they possessed separate and
independent powers and rights. When the society was formed,
it possessed jointly all the previously separate and independent
powers and rights of the individuals who formed it, and all the
other powers and rights, which result from the social union.
The aggregate of these powers and these rights composes the
sovereignty of the society or nation.22

This was the crux of popular sovereignty—that sovereignty
resided in the body politic, or “the people themselves,” and that

19. RICHARD WOODDESON, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE TREATED OF IN THE
PRELIMINARY PART OF A COURSE OF LECTURES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 22 (London,
T. Payne & Son 1783). Barnett nicely grapples with this tricky aspect of social-contract
theory. See p. 74 (“[I]n the absence of such express consent, we must ask what each person
could be presumed to have consented to.”).
20. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 10, at 570; ADAMS, supra note 17, at 6.
21. See, e.g., James Wilson, Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative
Authority of the British Parliament (1774), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON,
supra note 16, at 3, 5 n.c. (“The right of sovereignty is that of commanding finally—but in
order to procure real felicity; for if this end is not obtained, sovereignty ceases to be a
legitimate authority.”).
22. Wilson, supra note 16, at 556; see also, e.g., Theophilus Parsons, Essex Result
(1778), in THEOPHILUS PARSONS, MEMOIR OF THEOPHILUS PARSONS 359, 366 (Boston,
Ticknor & Fields 1861) (“When men form themselves into society, and erect a body politic
or State, they are to be considered as one moral whole, which is in possession of the
supreme power of the State. This supreme power is composed of the powers of each
individual collected together, and VOLUNTARILY parted with by him.”); LOCKE, supra
note 16, at bk. 2, chap. 8, § 96 (“For when any number of Men have, by the consent of
every individual, made a Community, they have thereby made that Community one Body,
with a Power to act as one Body, which is only by the Will and Determination of the
Majority.”).
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members of the government exercised power merely as agents of
the people.
To be sure, as Barnett highlights, James Wilson’s opinion in
Chisolm v. Georgia famously described individuals as “original
sovereigns,” noting that “[t]he sovereign, when traced to his
source, must be found in the man.”23 But Wilson clarified that his
use of the term “sovereign” was idiosyncratic,24 referring to the
source of governmental legitimacy rather than the possessor of
supreme political authority. Putting aside terminology, Wilson’s
point was conventional. The people, as a collective body politic—
not legislatures or kings, and not individuals—possessed the
supreme power under a social contract, even though that
authority was founded on the presumed consent of every
individual.25
FOUNDING-ERA RIGHTS
In modern legal thought, the rights listed in the Constitution
stem from a common source: their enumeration. For the
Founders, however, bills of rights declared rather than created
most rights.26 And these declarations typically included two
different types of rights, each with its own origin and structure.
Declarations of rights, one commentator noted in 1787, combined
protections for “natural liberty . . . retain[ed]” with “some
particular engagements of protection, on the part of
government.”27 Or, as Thomas Jefferson put it, bills of rights
23. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 456, 458 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.)
(emphasis added).
24. Id. at 454 (“I intend not to substitute new [terms]; but the expressions themselves
I shall certainly use for purposes different from those, for which hitherto they have been
frequently used.”).
25. See id. at 454–58; Wilson, supra note 16, at 556–62; Pennsylvania Ratification
Convention Debates (Dec. 4, 1787) (remarks of James Wilson), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 493–94 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976)
(“[I]n the United States the people retain the supreme power . . . and exercise it either
collectively or by representation.”).
26. See Jack N. Rakove, The Dilemma of Declaring Rights, in THE NATURE OF
RIGHTS AT THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND BEYOND 181, 187 (Barry Alan Shain ed.,
2007); John Phillip Reid, The Authority of Rights at the American Founding, in THE
NATURE OF RIGHTS, supra, at 67, 97; Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN.
L. REV. 171, 171 (1992).
27. An Old Whig No. 4, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 27, 1787, in 13 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 497, 501 (John
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981); see REID, supra note 4, at 93 (although
terminology was fluid, “there is no doubt that people in the eighteenth century
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declared both “unceded portions of right,” like “freedom of
religion,” and “also certain fences which experience has proved
peculiarly efficacious against wrong, and rarely obstructive of
right,” like “trial by jury, Habeas corpus laws, [and] free
presses.”28
These different types of rights corresponded to the different
stages of political development in social-contract theory:
1. In a state of nature, individuals had natural rights. Natural
rights were easy to identify because they were things that people
could do without a government, like eat, pray, or speak. “A
natural right is an animal right,” Thomas Paine succinctly
explained, “and the power to act it, is supposed, either fully or in
part, to be mechanically contained within ourselves as
individuals.29 Or, as Zephaniah Swift put it, natural rights were
“the enjoyment and exercise of a power to do as we think proper,
without any other restraint than what results from the law of
nature, or what may be denominated the moral law.”30

distinguished between natural rights and positive rights possessed by contract or
prescription”); see, e.g., BENJAMIN RUSH, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE PRESENT
GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN FOUR LETTERS TO THE PEOPLE OF
PENNSYLVANIA 3 (Philadelphia, Styner & Cist 1777) (noting the combination of “natural
and civil rights” in the Pennsylvania bill of rights); Federal Farmer No. 6 (Dec. 25, 1787),
in 20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 979,
983–84 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2004) (“Of rights, some are natural and unalienable,
of which even the people cannot deprive individuals: Some are constitutional or
fundamental; these cannot be altered or abolished by the ordinary laws; . . . and some are
common or mere legal rights, that is, such as individuals claim under laws which the
ordinary legislature may alter or abolish at pleasure.”); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (June 8,
1789) (remarks of Rep. James Madison) (noting the presence of “natural right[s] and
“positive rights” in his proposed bill of rights). The first two volumes of the Annals were
printed twice—first in the 1830s using headings that read “Gales & Seaton’s History of
Debates in Congress” (as part of an effort described in 1843 as “the sample volume[s],”
The History and Debates of Congress, N.Y. TRIBUNE, Jan. 27, 1843, at 2), and second in
the 1840s using headings that read “History of Congress” (as part of a continuous series
covering congressional debates from 1789 to 1824). Citations in this Essay are to the
“History of Congress” volumes.
28. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Noah Webster, Jr. (Dec. 4, 1790), in 18 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 131, 132 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1971). Elsewhere, Jefferson
referred to the latter category of rights as “instruments for administering the government,
so peculiarly trust-worthy, that we should never leave the legislature at liberty to change
them.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David Humphreys (Mar. 18, 1789), in 14 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 676, 678 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
29. Common Sense [Thomas Paine], Candid and Critical Remarks on Letter 1, Signed
Ludlow, PA. JOURNAL AND THE WEEKLY ADVERTISER, June 4, 1777, at 1.
30. 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
15 (New Haven, S. Converse 1822).
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2. When forming a political society in a social contract,
individuals agreed to retain some of their natural rights. These
retained natural rights, William Blackstone noted, comprised
“natural liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no farther)
as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the
public.”31
3. Either when forming a political society or when
constituting a government, the people might also recognize
certain fundamental positive rights to limit governmental power.32
These positive rights, unlike natural rights, were legal privileges
or immunities defined in terms of governmental action or
inaction, like the rights of due process, habeas corpus, and
confrontation.
4. Finally, after the formation of a political society and
government, lawmakers could create ordinary positive rights,
which we now refer to as common-law or statutory rights. These
“mere legal rights,” Federal Farmer explained, were “such as
individuals claim under laws which the ordinary legislature may
alter or abolish at pleasure.”33
Recovering the meanings and enforceability of FoundingEra rights thus requires attention to their type.
RETAINED NATURAL RIGHTS
Retained natural rights were not determinate legal rights.
Rather, with the exception of certain “rights of the mind” (i.e., the
freedoms of conscience and thought),34 these were aspects of
natural liberty that were subject to regulation only in the interest

31.
32.

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125.
See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 9–34 (2004). Quite confusingly, some
Founders occasionally referred to certain positive rights as founded on the “nature” of
man or the “nature” of government, occasionally leading them to describe positive rights
like the right to a jury as “natural.” See Reid, supra note 26, at 94; CHIPMAN, supra note 8,
at 112 (“Both [natural rights and civil rights] are natural rights, and equally guaranteed to
him by the laws of his nature.”); see, e.g., Virginia Ratification Convention Debates (June
16, 1788) (remarks of George Mason), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1328 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino
eds., 1993) (describing “certain great and important rights” against legislative power as
“the great rights of human nature”).
33. Federal Farmer No. 6, supra note 27, at 984.
34. CHIPMAN, supra note 8, at 174 (“r[i]ghts of the mind . . . can never justly be
subject to civil regulations”).
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of the political society and its members, and only with the consent
of the people.35
The Founders were emphatic that natural liberty could be
restrained only in the public interest.36 As Theophilus Parson
explained, “Each individual . . . surrenders the power of
controuling his natural alienable rights, ONLY WHEN THE GOOD
OF THE WHOLE REQUIRES it.”37 St. George Tucker put the point
more dramatically, writing that whenever natural liberty “is, by
the laws of the state, further restrained than is necessary and
expedient for the general advantage, a state of civil slavery
commences immediately.”38 Indeed, many described the
protection of natural liberty as “the principal aim of society.”39
Yet the Founders were equally insistent that natural liberty
should be restrained when doing so promoted the common good.
Natural liberty, Nathaniel Chipman declared, “must be in a just
compromise with the convenience and happiness of others.”40
This was a common refrain. “[N]o government . . . can exist,”
James Wilson asserted, “unless private and individual rights are
subservient to the public and general happiness of the nation.”41
35. See, e.g., OTIS, supra note 11, at 30 (“The Colonists being . . . entitled to all the
rights of nature . . . are not to be restrained in the exercise of any of these rights, but for
the evident good of the whole community . . . and if [natural liberty is] taken from them
without their consent, they are so far enslaved.”); ADAMS, supra note 17, at 123 (laws must
be “made with common consent . . . for the general interest, or the public good”).
36. For discussions of the “common good,” “public interest,” and “general welfare,”
see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 53–
65, 608 (2d ed. 1998); WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN
IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY
ERA 216–27 (rev. ed. 2001).
37. Parsons, supra note 22, at 366.
38. St. George Tucker, On the State of Slavery in Virginia (1796), in VIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SELECTED WRITINGS 402, 407 (1999).
Americans commonly referred to the deprivation of natural rights as “slavery.”
39. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *124.
40. CHIPMAN, supra note 8, at 174–75.
41. JAMES WILSON, THE SUBSTANCE OF A SPEECH DELIVERED BY JAMES WILSON,
ESQ. EXPLANATORY OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE PROPOSED FŒDERAL
CONSTITUTION . . . 8 (Philadelphia, Thomas Bradford 1787); see, e.g., New York
Ratification Convention Debates (June 24, 1788) (remarks of Alexander Hamilton), in 22
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1863 (John
P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2008) (“There must be a perpetual accommodation and sacrifice of
local advantage to general expediency.”); Civis [David Ramsay], To The Citizens of South
Carolina, CHARLESTON COLUMBIAN HERALD, Feb. 4, 1788, in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 21, 22 (John P. Kaminski &
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986) (“[I]n society, every individual must sacrifice a part of his
natural rights; the minority must yield to the majority, and the collective interest must
controul particular interests . . . .”); Noah Webster, An Oration on the Anniversary of the
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Individual liberty mattered, of course, but the ultimate object—
“the first law of every government”—was “the happiness of the
society.”42 “True liberty,” James Iredell noted, “consists in such
restraints, and no greater, on the actions of each particular
individual as the common good of the whole requires.”43
Proper respect for the public interest meant that lawmakers
had to consider everyone’s interests, and not merely those of
particular individuals or factions.44 The government, in other
words, should not be “adverse to the rights of other citizens,” as
James Madison put it in Federalist No. 10, or act by “disregarding
the rights of another.”45 But this principle required only equal
consideration of and respect for of the natural rights of others; it
did not make those “rights” absolute or immutable. During the
First Congress, for instance, Federalist leader Theodore Sedgwick
explained that he “felt no difficulty” in defending governmental
authority “to interfere with contracts, public and private,”
whenever failing to do so would endanger “the public welfare.”46
Indeed, Americans reiterated over and over again that the
common good often required the sacrifice of individual rights.47
To be sure, the Founders disagreed at times about how much
natural liberty to maintain. But for the most part, the “liberal”
and “republican” traditions that Jack Balkin highlights in his

Declaration of Independence (1802), in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE
FOUNDING ERA: 1760-1805, at 1220, 1228 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds.,
1983) (“Of course, by the very constitution of society, the will of each member is restrained
by the laws of general utility, or common good, the details of which are to be regulated by
the supreme power.”).
42. Wilson, supra note 21, at 5.
43. James Iredell’s Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of
Massachusetts (Oct. 12, 1792), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 308, 310 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988).
44. See, e.g., ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 125
(2d ed., London, J. Darby 1704) (“The Laws that aim at the publick Good, make no
distinction of Persons.”); The Impartial Examiner No. 1, VA. INDEP. CHRONICLE, Feb. 27,
1788, in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
420, 420 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988) (government officials should
have “no other view than the general good of all without any regard to private interest . . .
[and] take equal care of the whole body of the community, so as not to favor one part more
than another”).
45. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 57, 60 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(emphases added).
46. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1169 (Feb. 10, 1790) (remarks of Rep. Theodore Sedgwick).
47. See supra notes 40 to 43 and accompanying text. But see BARNETT, p. 75 (“[T]he
common good . . . consists of the protection of each person’s life, liberty, and property.”).
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contribution to this symposium48 were simply different
conceptions of how to pursue the public good—and were not yet
competing theories about the first principles of government.49
Only later did many Americans shift “from a commitment to the
public welfare to an interest in wealth accumulations,”50 making
libertarian policies not just a means of pursuing the general
welfare but an end in themselves.
For some Founders, legislative authority to restrain natural
liberty in the public interest effectively meant that individuals
surrendered all of their natural liberty to the control of the
political society. “[M]ankind have found it necessary to give up
[natural] liberty,” Connecticut jurist Zephaniah Swift wrote, “and
unite in society for mutual assistance, protection, and defence:
hence the origin of civil rights.”51 Or, as Melancton Smith asked
rhetorically at the New York ratification convention, “What is
government itself, but a restraint upon the natural rights of the
people?”52 Yet others insisted that Americans had given up none
of their natural rights. In a republic, Alexander Hamilton
declared in Federalist No. 84, “the people surrender nothing.”53
Federalist commentaries frequently echoed this theme.54
48. See Balkin, supra note 7, at 31.
49. See Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism and Early American Historiography, 39
WM. & MARY Q. 334, 339 (1982) (contrasting the idea of “a uniform general interest” with
the view “that the competing ambitions of self-interested individuals would produce the
greatest public benefit”); JOYCE APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE
HISTORICAL IMAGINATION 183 (1992) (describing self-interest, from a liberal perspective,
as a “benign regulator of human conduct”); see also WOOD, supra note 36, at xi (“It is
important to remember that the boxlike categories of ‘republicanism’ and ‘liberalism’ are
essentially the inventions of us historians, and as such they are dangerous if heuristically
necessary distortions of a very complicated past reality.”).
50. James L. Hutson, Virtue Besieged: Virtue, Equality, and the General Welfare in
the Tariff Debates of the 1820s, 14 J. EARLY REP. 523, 525 (1994).
51. SWIFT, supra note 30, at 15; see 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125
(“[E]very man, when he enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty.”); LOCKE,
supra note 16, at bk. 2, chap. 9, § 131 (“Men when they enter into Society, give up the
Equality, Liberty, and executive Power they had in the state of Nature, into the hands of
the Society, to be so far disposed of by the Legislative, as the good of the Society shall
require.”).
52. New York Ratification Convention Debates (June 25, 1788) (remarks of
Melancton Smith), in 22 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 41, at 1879.
53. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 45, at 578 (Alexander Hamilton).
54. See, e.g., Remarker, INDEP. CHRONICLE, Dec. 27, 1787, in 5 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 527, 529 (John
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1998); Virginia Ratification Convention Debates
(June 16, 1788) (remarks of George Nicholas), in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
32, at 1334.
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Based on these statements, we might suspect that Americans
sharply disagreed about the scope of retained natural liberty. But
this conclusion would be mistaken. The conflict was semantic
rather than substantive, with broad agreement that the
government could restrict natural liberty in the public interest.
Ostensible disagreements about the retention of natural
rights stemmed partly from differing views about the scope of
natural liberty in a state of nature. In particular, the idea that
people sacrificed some of their natural rights upon entering
society came under attack from those who thought that man was
“sociable by the laws of his nature” and thus had “no right to
pursue his own interest, or happiness, to the exclusion of that of
his fellow men.”55 Consequently, because natural rights were
already circumscribed by social obligations, it was unnecessary to
give up any natural rights upon entering a political society. “To
give up the performance of any action, which is forbidden by the
laws of moral and social nature,” Nathaniel Chipman insisted,
“cannot be deemed a sacrifice.”56
Others thought that natural liberty was fully preserved
because of the representative structure of the government.57 An
example will illustrate the point. Does a person who sells land give
up a right? In a sense, yes—the seller no longer owns the property.
But in another sense, no—a right of alienation is exercised, but the
seller has not given up the right to own land. Discussions of
natural rights at the Founding straddled the same linguistic
ambiguity. And the reason why is crucially important:
representative institutions could consent to restrictions of natural
liberty on behalf of individuals.
To be sure, natural rights were individual rights. Indeed, the
Founders widely viewed the rights to life, liberty, and property as
among the inalienable natural rights of individuals. Thus, as the

55. CHIPMAN, supra note 8, at 75; see Hamburger, supra note 14, at 945–46; see also,
e.g., 1 THOMAS RUTHERFORD, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW 36 (Cambridge, J.
Bentham 1754) (“It is therefore the law of [man’s] nature, that he should live in society
with others of his own species[,] . . . that he should join with them in a common interest,
[and] that he should bind himself to them in such a manner as to labour with them for a
general good.”).
56. CHIPMAN, supra note 8, at 74.
57. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
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Virginia Assembly declared in 1774, an individual’s property
could not be “wrested from him . . . without his own Consent.”58
But the Founders equally accepted that an individual’s “own
Consent” could be granted by a representative legislature.
“[Social-contract] theory,” James Madison explained, “supposes,
either that it was a part of the original compact, that the will of the
majority was to be deemed the will of the whole, or that this was
a law of nature, resulting from the nature of political society
itself.”59 Therefore, “the sovereignty of the society as vested in &
exercisable by the majority, may do anything that could be
rightfully done by the unanimous concurrence of the members.”60
Some aspects of natural liberty, like having thoughts, were
understood to be beyond an individual’s control and therefore
could not properly be restrained even with consent.61 But an
individual’s other retained natural rights were subject to restraint
through “laws to which he has given his consent, either in person,
or by his representative.”62
58. Virginia House of Burgesses, Memorial to the House of Lords, VA. GAZETTE,
July 21, 1774, at 2.
59. Madison, supra note 10, at 570.
60. Id. (emphasis added); see also James Wilson, Of Man, as a Member of Society, in
1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 16, at 621, 639 (“In society, when
the sentiments of the members are not unanimous, the voice of the majority must be
deemed the will of the whole. That the majority, by any vote, should bind not only
themselves, but those also who dissent from that vote, seems, at first, to be inconsistent
with the well known rule[ ] . . . that no one can be bound by the act of another, without his
own consent. But . . . society is constituted for a certain purpose; and . . . every thing
necessary for carrying it on shall be done.”); SIDNEY, supra note 44, at 69 (“[W]hen a
People is, by mutual compact, join’d together in a civil Society, there is no difference as to
Right, between that which is done by them all in their own Persons, or by some deputed
by all, and acting according to the Powers receiv’d from all.”).
61. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 10, at 571 (“[T]he reserved rights of individuals (of
conscience for example) in becoming parties to the original compact [are] beyond the
legitimate reach of sovereignty, wherever vested or however viewed.”); N.H. CONST. of
1784, pt. 1, art. 4 (“Among the natural rights, some are in their very nature unalienable,
because no equivalent can be given or received for them. Of this kind are the RIGHTS OF
CONSCIENCE.”); Parsons, supra note 22, at 365 (identifying inalienable rights as “the rights
of conscience,” or “duties, for the discharge of which we are accountable to our Creator
and benefactor, which no human power can cancel”); JOHN THOMSON, AN ENQUIRY,
CONCERNING THE LIBERTY, AND LICENTIOUSNESS OF THE PRESS . . . 11 (New York,
Johnson & Stryker 1801) (“All men are endowed, by nature, with the power of thinking;
yet have they no controul over their thoughts.”). Notably, the Founders used the term
“inalienable” in different ways—sometimes referring to natural rights that could not be
controlled without consent, and other times referring to a narrower set of natural rights
that could not be restrained even with consent.
62. Alexander Hamilton, A Full Vindication of the Measures of the Congress (Dec.
15, 1774), in 1 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 17, at 45, 47. Barnett
attributes to the Founders the view that implied consent was valid only so long as the
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Consequently, most retained natural rights were individual
rights that could be collectively defined and controlled. The
Declaration of Independence referred to the inalienability of
natural rights in this sense.63 Property was an inalienable natural
right, for instance, and therefore Americans could not divest
control of their property to an unaccountable king or
Parliament.64 But the Declaration’s invocation of natural rights
had nothing to do with constraints on the powers of representative
legislatures. Inalienability undergirded the American stance
about who could collect taxes and regulate property, but labeling
something as a “natural right” did not suggest well-defined
limitations on governmental power.65
In sum, although American elites spoke in radically different
ways about how much natural liberty was retained in the social
contract, they widely agreed on the substance—that retained
natural rights could be regulated in the public interest by the
people or their representatives.
FUNDAMENTAL POSITIVE RIGHTS
In contrast to retained natural rights, some positive rights
imposed firm obligations and constraints on governmental
authority. These fundamental positive rights included a slew of
natural rights of individuals were preserved. See pp. 74–78. But natural rights were
preserved by having a representative legislature act in the public interest, not necessarily
by making portions of natural liberty immune from governmental control.
63. See MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC: STUDIES IN THE
FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 112 (1996); see also, e.g., OTIS,
supra note 11, at 37 (“The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his
property, without his consent in person, or by representation.”).
64. The standard American definition of representative consent required that each
geographical area have actual representatives, thus rejecting the British notion of virtual
representation. See generally JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2011). Yet American elites generally held fast to virtual
representation with respect to other characteristics like age, gender, race, and property
ownership.
65. Thus, for instance, recognition of the inalienable right of conscience did not
necessarily conflict with governmental support for religion, use of religious oaths, and so
forth. To be sure, some invoked natural rights in arguing “that Religion is wholly exempt
from [governmental] cognizance.” James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against
Religious Assessments (ca. June 20, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON:
CONGRESSIONAL SERIES 295, 299 (Robert A. Rutland & William M. E. Rachal eds., 1973).
But this position turned on a series of intermediate arguments, not simply the inalienability
of conscience. Cf. Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1954 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 384 (“It is indeed stressing the obvious to conclude
that, in [Madison’s] mind at least, . . . the establishment of a religion by law is not per se an
infringement of the equal rights of conscience.”).
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customary rules, like the guarantee of a jury trial, the right of
habeas corpus, and the ban on press licensing.66 They were, as
Thomas Jefferson put it, “certain fences which experience has
proved particularly efficacious against wrong, and rarely
obstructive of right.”67 These rights operated more in the mode of
“rights as trumps” that is familiar to modern lawyers.
Not all common-law or statutory rights enjoyed
“fundamental” status. In general, legislatures could change laws
whenever they liked. What typically made rights “fundamental”
in the English tradition was, somewhat circularly, a widespread
belief that they were inviolable—a consensus that often emerged
fully only after political contests over the fundamentality of the
right, like debates about confrontation in the sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries or about press licensing in the late
seventeenth century. “Like other forms of customary law,” Larry
Kramer observes, this fundamental law “was uncertain and openended” in some respects, but “[i]t did not follow that nothing was
fixed.”68 In the United States, the enumeration of rights in written
constitutions or declarations of rights also became an important
indicator of their fundamentality.69
For present purposes, though, the crucial point is that some
positive rights had fundamental status and were very similar to
our modern notion of constitutional rights. These rights, like the
right to a jury trial and the ban on ex post facto laws, operated as
legal privileges or immunities that could be defended in court
against legislative encroachment.
USING RIGHTS TO CONSTRUE POWERS
Barnett uses the “prior existence” of natural rights to favor a
narrow construal of governmental power—and especially federal

66.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Noah Webster, Jr. (Dec. 4, 1790), in 18 PAPERS

OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 28, at 132.
67. Id.; see also KRAMER, supra note 32, at

9–34. At least in theory, these rights had
a positivist origin—they were not simply philosophical abstractions. See Federal Farmer
No. 16 (Jan. 20, 1788), in 20 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at 1051, 1057–58
(referring to positive rights as “stipulated rights” that “individuals acquire by compact”
and must be claimed “under compacts, or immemorial usage”).
68. KRAMER, supra note 32, at 14.
69. See, e.g., Federal Farmer No. 6, supra note 27, at 984 (defining fundamental
positive rights as ones that “individuals claim under the solemn compacts of the people, as
constitutions, or at least under laws so strengthened by long usage as not to be repealable
by the ordinary legislature”).
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power (pp. 78, 172-173, 189-195). Founding-Era evidence,
however, shows a more complicated relationship between rights
and powers, depending largely on the type of right at issue.
Many Founders thought that fundamental positive rights
limited governmental authority even when unenumerated.70
Consider, for instance, the rule against press licensing—a
principle commonly known as the “liberty of the press.”71 This
freedom, one commentator explained during the ratification
debates, was “a privilege, with which every inhabitant is born;—a
right . . . too sacred to require being mentioned.”72
Americans had two different accounts of why it was
unnecessary to enumerate fundamental positive rights. Some
thought that the social contract guaranteed positive rights in
return for individuals’ sacrifice of control over their natural
liberty.73 Consequently, these rights were guaranteed at a preconstitutional stage, making their constitutional enumeration
unnecessary. Meanwhile, others thought that these positive rights
were implicitly excepted from constitutional grants of power.74
Enumerated powers, in other words, were more like slices of
Swiss cheese, with the holes representing a lack of authority to
abridge certain rights, than like slices of American cheese, with

70. See KRAMER, supra note 32, at 41; Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten
Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987).
71. See Pennsylvania Ratification Convention Debates (Dec. 1, 1787) (remarks of
James Wilson), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 25, at 455 (“what is meant by
the liberty of the press is, that there should be no antecedent restraint upon it”).
72. Uncus, MD. JOURNAL, Nov. 9, 1787, in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 76, 78 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino
eds., 1983).
73. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (remarks of Rep. James Madison) (referring
to certain “positive rights, which may seem to result from the nature of the compact”);
Parsons, supra note 22, at 367 (referring to “the equivalent that every man receives [in the
social contract] as a consideration for the rights he has surrendered,” which positive rights
are “unassailable by the supreme power” even prior to the creation of a constitution); cf.
John Adams, Reply to A Friendly Address to All Reasonable Americans, in 2 PAPERS OF
JOHN ADAMS 193, 195 (Robert J. Taylor et al. eds., 2003) (“There are therefore certain
fundamental Laws, and certain original Rights, reserved expressly or tacitly, by every
People in their first Confederation in Society, and erection of Government.”).
74. See, e.g., Fœderal Constitution, PA. GAZETTE, Oct. 10, 1787, in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at 362, 363 (“[T]he Liberty of the Press would
have been an inherent and political right, as long as nothing was said against it.”); A Citizen
of New-York [John Jay], An Address to the People of the State of New York (Apr. 15, 1788),
in 20 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at 922, 933 (mentioning in a discussion of
press freedom and jury rights that “silence and blank paper neither grant nor take away
any thing”).
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authority to do anything that might facilitate the use or
effectiveness of those powers.
Not everyone held this view about the non-necessity of
enumeration. Some Founders favored an equitable construction
of statutes—not of constitutional powers—to avoid conflicts with
certain unenumerated rights,75 without giving these rights the
status of supreme law.76 When recognized, however, positive
rights with fundamental status restricted governmental power.
By contrast, retained natural rights did not impose strict
limits on the powers of representative bodies. Rather, with the
exception of the freedoms of conscience and thought,77 individuals
surrendered control of their natural rights for the common good.
Consequently, some Founders plausibly used social-contract
theory to favor broader governmental power than the “literal
meaning” of constitutional text might otherwise suggest.78
A notable example is Alexander Hamilton’s defense of
federal power to charter a national bank. The scope of federal
power, he argued, was “a question of fact to be made out by fair
reasoning & construction upon the particular provisions of the
constitution—taking as guides the general principles & general
ends of government.”79 It was thus a “sound maxim of
construction,” Hamilton insisted, “that the powers contained in a
constitution of government . . . ought to be construed liberally, in
advancement of the public good.”80 The ends of federal power, he
75. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 390 (1805) (“Where rights
are infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown, where the general system of
the laws is departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible
clearness to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects.”); cf.
Michael W. McConnell, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment: How Does Lockean
Legal Theory Assist in Interpretation, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 20–21 (2010) (supporting
this approach but without fully using this Essay’s taxonomy of rights).
76. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398–99 (1798) (opinion of Iredell,
J.).
77. As rights that could not be given up even with consent, the Founders treated the
freedoms of conscience and thought as unique among natural rights. See supra note 61.
78. Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an
Act to Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97,
106 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965).
79. Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 105. Indeed, Hamilton argued that some federal powers flowed “from the
nature of political society”—that is, from the existence of a national body politic—rather
than from particular enumerated powers. Id. at 100. James Wilson had taken a similar
position under the Articles of Confederation. See James Wilson, Considerations on the
Bank of North America (1785), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note
16, at 60, 66 (“The United States have general rights, general powers, and general
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was arguing, should be construed to promote “the general
interests of the Union.”81 Moreover, Hamilton wrote, the
existence of federal sovereignty indicated federal authority “to
employ all the means requisite, and fairly applicable to the
attainment of the ends of [its] power.”82
In a way that scholars have previously overlooked, the
implicit reservation of natural rights in the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments reinforced Hamilton’s conclusion. To be sure, these
amendments proved that federal power was limited,83 thus
obligations, not derived from any particular states, nor from all the particular states, taken
separately; but resulting from the union of the whole.”). A “further criterion” when
construing federal power, Hamilton continued, was to ask: “Does the proposed measure
abridge a preexisting right of any State, or of any individual? If it does not, there is a strong
presumption in favour of its constitutionality . . . .” Hamilton, supra note 78, at 107. These
“preexisting right[s]” of individuals likely referred to longstanding positive rights, not
natural liberty. See supra notes 70–74, infra note 105, and accompanying text. In any event,
Hamilton never suggested a paramount concern for individual rights. Hamilton, supra, at
109 (noting that Congress could “alter the common law of each state in abridgement of
individual rights”).
81. This quotation is from Resolution VI, which set out the scope of federal
legislative power prior to revisions in the committee of detail. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1911); see JACK N. RAKOVE,
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 178
(1996). Modern proponents of national power have invoked Resolution VI either in
defense of freestanding federal authority to solve problems that require collective action,
see Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010), or as a structural principle that “underlies
and should inform the proper construction of all of Congress’s enumerated powers,” JACK
M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 377 (2011). In response, Kurt Lash criticizes
nationalists for drawing on the private intentions of the Framers rather than the public
meaning of the Constitution, pointing out that Resolution VI did not survive the drafting
process and played virtually no role in shaping public understandings of the Constitution.
Kurt T. Lash, “Resolution VI”: The Virginia Plan and Authority to Resolve Collective
Action Problems Under Article I, Section 8, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2123 (2012). This
Essay shows how the general principles of social-contract theory supplied Federalists with
a stronger basis for claiming federal power to address federal problems.
82. Hamilton, supra note 78, at 98; see also, e.g., A.B., HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, Jan. 2,
1788, in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 54, at 596, 597 (the “[federal] government
is to possess absolute and uncontroulable powers” but those powers extend only to
“national objects: such as concern the whole in union, and therefore ought to be under the
government and controul of the whole”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 31, supra note 45, at 195
(Alexander Hamilton) (“A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to
the full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care, . . . free from every other
control, but a regard to the public good and to the sense of the people.”).
83. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1901 (Feb. 2, 1791) (remarks of Rep. James Madison).
It seems to me that Madison was arguing simply that enumerated federal powers should
be construed to maintain limits on federal authority—not that those powers ought to be
construed “strictly” whenever liberty is restricted. Cf. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING
THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 242 (rev. ed. 2014); KURT T.
LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 68–69 (2009).
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answering the Anti-Federalist objection that “appoint[ing] a
legislature, without any reservation of the rights of individuals,
surrender[s] all power . . . to the government.”84 The absence of
an enumerated power over the liberty of locomotion,85 for
instance, meant that the federal government lacked plenary
authority to restrict individual movement in the public interest.
Nonetheless, because locomotion was a retained natural right of
individuals, it was not within the exclusive domain of state control
either. Rather, Congress and state legislatures could each restrict
individual movement when pursuing their respective powers. The
implicit reservation of natural rights in the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments thus suggested parity in the means of federal and
state authority.86
ENFORCING RIGHTS
Today we tend to think about the judicial enforcement of
unenumerated or indeterminate rights through the lens of the
“counter-majoritarian difficulty.”87 Because these rights constrain
majority rule without the benefit of textual clarity, their judicial
definition and enforcement can exist only in uneasy tension with
the core democratic principle of self-rule.88
Quite brilliantly, then, Barnett opens his historical account
by embracing the Constitution’s undemocratic origins. The
Founders, he writes, “blamed the problems in the states under the
Articles of Confederation on an excess of democracy” (p. 26).
With this move, Barnett uses our undemocratic past to turn the
counter-majoritarian difficulty into a virtue. The Founders’
84. Agrippa No. 12 (Jan. 15, 1788), in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 54, at
720, 722.
85. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. at 2097 (July 5, 1798) (remarks of Rep. John Allen)
(mentioning “the liberty of locomotion, of going where I please”).
86. In this way, I tend to agree with Barnett that the Ninth Amendment directly
protects only individual rights, not collective states’ rights, see Randy E. Barnett, Kurt
Lash’s Majoritarian Difficulty, 60 STAN. L. REV. 937 (2008), but because federal powers
were limited and because retained natural rights could generally be collectively defined
and controlled, the reservation of rights implicit in the Ninth Amendment could readily
have had a state-empowering effect, cf. Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the
Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 895 (2008) (arguing that the Ninth Amendment
protects both individual rights and collective states’ rights).
87. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
88. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2626 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (“[J]udges are unelected and unaccountable, and . . . the legitimacy of their
power depends on confining it to the exercise of legal judgment.”).
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apparent scorn for democracy bolsters his originalist case for the
primacy of rights and for their judicial enforcement.
Missing, however, is any evidence that the Founders actually
supported the judicial protection of retained natural rights, either
directly or through a narrow construal of governmental power.
Instead, the historical record shows that they preserved retained
natural rights principally through constitutional structure, giving
legislators, not judges, nearly complete responsibility for
determining their proper scope. In this way, the standard
approach to guarding retained natural rights diverged
significantly from the enforcement of fundamental positive rights.
It is certainly true that by the late 1780s American political
elites were deeply skeptical of majoritarian politics and had
largely abandoned the British view that elected assemblies were
“the full and exclusive representatives of the people.”89 Instead,
Americans embraced the idea that legislatures represented the
people only imperfectly, that other governmental officials were
also agents of the people, and that the people themselves had an
active role to play in exercising sovereignty.90 At the same time,
cynicism grew among elites regarding the capacity of the people
themselves to pursue the common good. People frequently cared
only about their individual interests, James Madison wrote in
1787, thus leading to “unjust violations of the rights and interests
of the minority” because of a lack of neutrality toward the various
interests in society.91 As Madison later put it, “the great danger
lies rather in the abuse of the community than in the Legislative
body.”92

89. WOOD, supra note 36, at 597. “In America,” Wood explains, “the people were
never really represented in the English sense of the term.” Rather, “representation of the
people” was “always tentative and partial.” Id. at 600.
90. See id. at 597–600; KRAMER, supra note 32, at 35–72; Wilson, supra note 16, at
556–58. On the importance of constitutional ratification conventions, see Tate, supra note
9, at 379–85. But see Giles Hickory [Noah Webster], Government, N.Y. AM. MAG., Feb. 1,
1788, in 20 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at 738, 739 (“The sense of the people
is no better known in a convention, than in the Legislature.”).
91. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in
9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: CONGRESSIONAL SERIES 345, 355, 355–57 (Robert
A. Rutland & William M. E. Rachal eds., 1975); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra
note 45, at 60–61 (James Madison) (“When a majority is included in a faction, the form of
popular government . . . enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the
public good and the rights of other citizens.”).
92. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (June 8, 1789) (remarks of Rep. James Madison).
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Yet for the Founders, addressing these challenges called for
better representation—not less of it. After all, restrictions of life,
liberty, and property required the consent of the people. The goal
of reform, therefore, was to find “a Republican remedy for the
diseases most incident to Republican Government.”93 For
instance, Madison famously speculated that an extended national
sphere would break the society “into a greater variety of interests,
of pursuits, of passions, which [would] check each other.”94 He
also sought “a process of elections as will most certainly extract
from the mass of the Society the purest and noblest characters
which it contains.”95 The government, he hoped, would represent
the entire society, and not simply the private interests of the
majority.
In this way, the Founders’ “anti-democratic” efforts did not
reflect an understanding of “natural rights” as rigid constraints on
governmental power. The good of the whole still took priority
over private rights and interests. Rather, the Founders wanted to
create a system of government that best pursued the public
interest while retaining its representative form. And this effort, in
turn, prompted creative thinking about institutional roles.
With the demise of legislative sovereignty, for instance,
American judges assumed a greater part in enforcing fundamental
positive rights.96 The justification for this shift was
straightforward. If judges identified a conflict between the will of
the people (the principal) and the will of their representatives (the
agents), the will of the people took priority.97 But constitutional
commands were often unclear, and legislatures were much closer
than judges to the people themselves. Judges in the Founding Era
thus widely deferred to legislative judgments absent clear
constitutional violations.98 (Importantly, the clarity of
93. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 45, at 65 (James Madison) (emphasis
added); see KRAMER, supra note 32, at 46–49.
94. Madison, supra note 91, at 357. See generally Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s
Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611 (1999) (exploring Madison’s ideas on this topic and their
broader reception, or lack thereof).
95. Madison, supra note 91, at 357.
96. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008).
97. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 45, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton).
98. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 140–42 (1893); Christopher R. Green, Clarity
and Reasonable Doubt in Early State-Constitutional Judicial Review, 57 S. TEX. L. REV.
169, 172–83 (2015); John McGinnis, The Duty of Clarity, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 843, 880–
904 (2016).
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constitutional commands did not depend solely on text but “drew
on well-established principles of the customary constitution as
well.”99) When a constitutional provision was unclear, Alexander
Hamilton indicated in Federalist No. 84, its meaning “must
depend on legislative discretion, regulated by public opinion.”100
Consequently, judicial review at the Founding was not all or
nothing. Some constitutional provisions, like the jury guarantee
and the ban on ex post facto laws, functioned as legal rules
governed largely by judicial decisions. Even without a bill of
rights, judges sometimes viewed these principles as implied
limitations on governmental power.101 (With enumerated rights,
the will of the people was reflected in the enumeration of the
right; with unenumerated rights, some thought that the will of the
people was demonstrated by longstanding respect for the right.)102
Meanwhile, other constitutional disputes—including many
involving federalism—typically were not judicially managed and
instead were left to political resolution.103
It is no surprise, therefore, that judicial applications of
retained natural rights were virtually nonexistent. Some judges
still occasionally invoked social-contract theory.104 Justice Samuel
Chase, for instance, used the theory to defend a presumption that
fundamental positive rights implicitly limited legislative
authority.105 But “natural rights” remained purely abstract. As
Chase explained to a jury in 1803,
I have long since subscribed to the opinion, that there could be
no rights of man in a state of nature, previous to the institution
of society. . . . It seems to me that personal liberty and rights,
can only be acquired by becoming a member of a community,
which gives the protection of the whole to every individual. . . .
99. KRAMER, supra note 32, at 99.
100. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 45, at 580 n.* (Alexander Hamilton).
Hamilton was writing about the scope of constitutional provisions in favor of the liberty of
the press, which he described as lacking “any definition which would not leave the utmost
latitude for evasion.” Id. at 580.
101. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Federal Farmer No. 6, supra note 27, at 984; Federal Farmer No. 16, supra
note 67, at 1057–58.
103. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see also Osborn v.
Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 895–96 (1824) (Johnson, J., dissenting)
(noting that powers Congress had exercised that were “not foreseen at the adoption of
constitution” were nonetheless “within the range of [Congress’s] discretion, [and] aloof
from judicial control, while unaffectedly exercised for the purposes of the constitution”).
104. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387–89 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.).
105. See KRAMER, supra note 32, at 42–43.
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[L]iberty, and rights, (and also property) must spring out of
civil society, and must be forever subject to the modification of
particular governments.106

Thus, while some Founders used social-contract theory to defend
implied constitutional boundaries, natural rights were not a
source of determinate, judicially enforceable law.
To be sure, social-contract theory required lawmakers to
pursue only the public interest, thus imposing a substantive
constraint on legislative power.107 Passing laws without regard for
the general welfare, it bears emphasis, violated a central tenet of
social-contract theory. But the difficulty of applying that standard
left very little room for judicial oversight. According to Brutus,
who described judicial review in more latitudinous terms than
anyone else at the Founding,108 the principle that legislatures had
to pursue the general welfare was “found, in practice, a most
pitiful restriction” because “there [was] no judge between [the
government] and the people,” and therefore “the rulers
themselves must, and would always, judge for themselves.”109
On rare occasion, judges hinted that their enforcement of
legislative acts would, in the words of Spencer Roane, be bounded
“by the constitutions of the general and state governments; and
limited also by considerations of justice.”110 Suzanna Sherry asserts
that Roane was embracing “broad judicial review and the
principle that unjust or unreasonable legislation should not be
enforced by judges.”111 But Roane clarified that only a “crying

106.

Jury Instruction of Samuel Chase (May 2, 1803), in CHARLES EVANS, REPORT
. . . 60, 61–62 (Baltimore, Samuel Butler &
George Keatinge 1805).
107. See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.
108. See Brutus No. 11 (Jan. 31, 1788), in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 512, 514 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino
eds., 1984) (“[Federal judges] will give the sense of every article of the constitution, that
may from time to time come before them. And in their decisions they will not confine
themselves to any fixed or established rules, but will determine, according to what appears
to them, the reason and spirit of the constitution. The opinions of the supreme court,
whatever they may be, will have the force of law; because there is no power provided in
the constitution, that can correct their errors, or controul their adjudications.”).
109. Brutus No. 6 (Dec. 27, 1787), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 108, at
110, 115.
110. Currie’s Adm’rs v. Mut. Assurance Soc’y, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 315, 346 (1809)
(opinion of Roane, J.) (emphasis added).
111. Suzanna Sherry, Independent Judges and Independent Justice, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 17 (1998).
OF THE TRIAL OF THE HON. SAMUEL CHASE
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grade of injustice” would warrant judicial invalidation.112 The
standard rule at the Founding was that judges could not answer
questions “of mere expediency or policy.”113 Nor could judges
overturn a statute because of an impermissible legislative purpose
absent a “high degree of certainty,” based principally on the
statute itself.114 The combination of these principles meant that,
both in theory and in practice, legislatures had virtually unfettered
authority over most retained natural rights.115
CONCLUSION
In thinking about original meaning, Our Republican
Constitution usefully counsels attention not merely to

112. Currie’s Adm’rs, 14 Va. at 350 (opinion of Roane, J.); see also Calder, 3 U.S. at
388 (opinion of Chase, J.) (“There are certain vital principles . . . which will determine and
overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power.” (emphasis added)); Bank of
State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 603 (Special Ct. 1831) (opinion of Green, J.) (“Some
acts, although not expressly forbidden, may be against the plain and obvious dictates of
reason.” (emphasis added)).
113. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 1 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON: RETIREMENT SERIES 500, 501 (David B. Mattern et al. eds., 2009);
see, e.g., Trs. of Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58, 88 (1805) (“[T]he judiciary are
only to expound and enforce the law and have no discretionary powers enabling them to
judge of the propriety or impropriety of laws.”); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 438 (June 8, 1789)
(remarks of Rep. James Madison) (“it is for [Congress] to judge of the necessity and
propriety” of laws).
114. Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784,
1796 (2008).
115. Barnett criticizes this conclusion as overlooking diversity in Founding-Era
thought. See Randy E. Barnett, Our Republican Constitution: Securing the Liberty and
Sovereignty of We the People, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 209, 210 (2016). With respect to
judicial application of principles of “natural justice,” however, historical evidence seems
to range from complete deference to legislative judgments, see, e.g., Calder, 3 U.S. at 399
(opinion of Iredell, J.); 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note
81, at 78 (remarks of George Mason) (“[Judges] could declare an unconstitutional law
void. But with regard to every law however unjust oppressive or pernicious, which did not
come plainly under this description, they would be under the necessity as Judges to give it
free course.”), to robust deference to legislative judgments, see supra note 112 and
accompanying text. In short, legislators had discretion with regard to how far natural rights
should be restrained in promotion of the public good, and judges could, at most, step in
only when it was clear that legislators had abused that discretion. For further discussion,
see Jud Campbell, Judicial Review and the Enumeration of Rights, GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y (forthcoming 2017). Rather than addressing whether and how judges could limit
legislatures to good-faith pursuit of the public interest, the evidence in Barnett’s response
focuses on whether and how judges could require a nexus between enumerated and
implied powers. See Barnett, supra, at 210–13. The relationship between these inquiries—
each of which might involve assessing pretext—is worth further thought.
Cf. Nelson, supra note 114, at 1796 (noting the limited nature of Founding-Era judicial
inquiries about legislative pretext).
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constitutional text but also to Founding-Era political philosophy.
For the Founders, constitutional interpretation often began with
principles derived from social-contract theory.
The Constitution’s preamble thus had a significance that we
have largely forgotten. “We the People . . . do ordain and establish
this Constitution.”116 These words emanated from social-contract
theory, indicating the formation of a national body politic with
sovereignty independent of the several states. As William Findley
put it, “In the Preamble, it is said, ‘We the People,’ and not ‘We
the States,’ which therefore is a compact between individuals
entering into society, and not between separate states enjoying
independent power and delegating a portion of that power for
their common benefit.”117
Exactly how a national body politic had emerged was
puzzling. A social contract required the unanimous consent of
individuals,118 and the Constitution certainly failed that test. Some
nationalists insisted that a national body politic had existed ever
since the Revolution. Others argued, perhaps more plausibly, that
the sovereign people of the several states had voluntarily parted
with some of their sovereignty and thereby formed a national
body politic for certain collective purposes. And many
proponents of states’ rights simply rejected the premise.119 The
Constitution, Thomas Jefferson famously insisted in 1798, was
merely a “compact under the style & title of a Constitution.”120
This debate had profound importance. If the Constitution
was merely a compact among sovereign states, and not a
“constitution” within the meaning of social-contract theory,
116. U.S. CONST., Preamble (emphases added).
117. Pennsylvania Ratification Convention Debates (Dec. 1, 1787) (remarks of
William Findley), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 25, at 447–48; see also Luther
Martin, Genuine Information No. 4 (Jan. 8, 1788), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 108, at 296, 297 (“It is in its very introduction declared to be a compact between the
people of the United States as individuals . . . [rather than] by the States as States in their
sovereign capacity.”).
118. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
119. For historical debates about the nature of the union, see Bernadette Meyler,
Between the States and the Signers: The Politics of the Declaration of Independence Before
the Civil War, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 541 (2016); Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution’s
Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the New Federalism and the Original Understanding,
94 MICH. L. REV. 615 (1995); H. Jefferson Powell, The Principles of ‘98: An Essay in
Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L. REV. 689 (1994); Andrew C. McLaughlin, Social Compact
and Constitutional Construction, 5 AM. HIST. REV. 467 (1900).
120. See The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, in 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 536 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2003).
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federal powers would have to be construed narrowly. The
Federalist argument for broad incidental powers, Virginia
congressman William Branch Giles commented during the 1791
bank debates, “seem to me to apply to a government growing out
of a state of society, and not to a government composed of
chartered rights from previously existing governments, or the
people of those governments.”121
Indeed, Virginia jurist St. George Tucker used compact
theory to justify a federal presumption of liberty. A “strict
construction” of federal power was warranted, he insisted,
“wherever the right of personal liberty, of personal security, or of
private property may become the subject of dispute.”122 Far from
basing this idea on a libertarian understanding of natural rights,
however, Tucker defended his presumption of liberty on the fact
that each individual had already “submitted himself” to the
authority of state government, and federal power “might
endanger his obedience” to state law.123 As Joseph Story noted,
Tucker’s “whole reasoning [was] founded, not on the notion, that
the rights of the people are concerned, but the rights of the
states.”124
On the other hand, if John Marshall was right that “it is a
constitution we are expounding,”125 founded on an implicit
national social contract, that conclusion potentially supported a
broader construal of federal powers, and perhaps even the
implied abrogation of some state authority. “[T]he powers
contained in a constitution of government . . . ought to be
construed liberally, in advancement of the public good,”
Alexander Hamilton wrote in 1791.126 “This rule,” he continued
121.
122.

2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1942 (Feb. 7, 1791) (remarks of Rep. William Branch Giles).
St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States (1803), in VIEW
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note
38, at 101–02. Later in the same work, Tucker wrote that “every power which concerns the
right of the citizen, must be construed strictly, where it may operate to infringe or impair
his liberty; and liberally, and for his benefit, where it may operate to his security and
happiness, the avowed object of the constitution,” id. at 246, without mentioning how to
treat putative powers that impinge upon liberty while promoting security and happiness.
123. Id. at 102.
124. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 411 (1833). A presumption against powers “touch[ing] the rights of property, or
of personal security, or liberty” was inappropriate, Story insisted, “in construing a
constitution of government, framed by the people for their own benefit and protection.”
Id. at § 413.
125. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis added).
126. Hamilton, supra note 78, at 105.
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“does not depend on the particular form of a government or on
the particular demarkation of the boundaries of its powers, but on
the nature and objects of government itself.”127
Far from settling methodological questions, however,
construing powers “in advancement of the public good”
intensified constitutional instability. As Joseph Priestley wrote in
his Essay on the First Principles of Government,
That the happiness of the whole community is the ultimate end
of government can never be doubted, and all claims of
individuals inconsistent with the public good are absolutely
null and void; but there is a real difficulty in determining what
general rules, respecting the extent of the power of government,
or of governors, are most conducive to the public good.128

Priestley’s description of this effort as “a real difficulty” was
putting it lightly. “According to this rule,” Joseph Story later
observed, “the most opposite interpretations of the same words
would be equally correct, according as the interpreter should
deem it odious or salutary.”129 Social-contract theory thus fueled
constitutional conflict, stimulating extraordinary debates in
Congress and among the broader American public over
interpretive methodology and the proper scope of federal
authority.130
Lurking in the background of these debates was a silent
harmony between republicanism and natural rights. With the
exception of certain “rights of the mind,” natural rights were not
determinate legal privileges or immunities that imposed fixed
limitations on governmental power. Rather, retained natural
rights were aspects of natural liberty that an individual could give
up only through his own consent, either in person or by his
127.
128.

Id.
JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, AN ESSAY ON THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT,
AND ON THE NATURE OF POLITICAL, CIVIL, AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 57 (2d ed.,
London, J. Johnson 1771) (emphasis added).
129. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 411 (2d ed., 1851); see also 1 STORY, supra note 124, at § 411 (using the word
“interpretator”). Story criticized this vacillating interpretive principle and preferred,
within the “fair sense” of the text, an interpretation “which best follows out the apparent
intention” of the people. Id. at § 413.
130. For congressional debates, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801 (1997). For broader constitutional and
political debates, see JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY
REPUBLIC: THE NEW NATION IN CRISIS (1993). For debates about interpretive methods,
see Gienapp, supra note 6.
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representative, and only in the public interest. Most retained
natural rights were therefore individual rights that could be
collectively defined and controlled by legislatures, with virtually
no room for judicial oversight. In the end, Founding-Era natural
rights were not really “rights” at all, in the modern sense. They
were the philosophical pillars of republican government.

